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This paper builds a baseline two-country model of real and monetary transmission in the
presence of optimal international price discrimination by ￿rms. Distributing traded goods to
consumers requires nontradables, intensive in local labor. Because of distribution services,
the price elasticity of demand is country-speci￿c and depends on exchange-rate ￿uctuations.
Hence, within limits dictated by the possibility of arbitrage, pro￿t-maximizing monopolistic
￿rms drive a wedge between prices across countries at both wholesale and retail level. Optimal
price discrimination results in a muted response of import and consumer prices to exchange-rate
movements. Despite low pass-through, a currency depreciation generally worsens the terms
of trade, consistent with the possibility of expenditure-switching eﬀects. We use our model
to derive general equilibrium expressions for the exchange-rate pass-through as a function
of fundamentals. Conditional pass-through varies depending on whether shocks are real or
nominal, transitory or permanent, thus suggesting caution in deriving structural interpretations
from average, unconditional estimates of price elasticities.
JEL classi￿cation: F3, F4
Keywords: exchange-rate pass-through, deviations from the law of one price, international
transmission, distribution services.Cross-border price diﬀerentials are one of the most apparent manifestations that the world
economy remains strikingly segmented along national boundaries. A large body of empirical
work weighs in against the proposition that good-market arbitrage is quick and eﬀective in
eliminating international price discrepancies for most types of tradable goods and services.1
Moreover, prices seem to respond only mildly, if at all, to changes in the nominal exchange
rate. Exchange rate pass-through, quite low for consumer prices, is far from complete also
for international prices.2 To the extent that incomplete exchange-rate pass-through is due to
destination-speci￿c markup adjustment by ￿rms, this is evidence of market segmentation, that
is, ￿pricing-to-market￿ (henceforth PTM).3 With PTM, high exchange-rate volatility implies
that buyers across national markets face systematically diﬀerent prices for otherwise identical
goods.4
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of endogenous incomplete pass-through
and PTM building on the presence of distributive trade as a plausible source of the deviations
from the law of one price. In our model, upstream ￿rms with monopoly power optimally
charge diﬀerent prices to competitive retailers situated in diﬀerent locations. What makes
the elasticity of demand diﬀer across markets is the need for local-input-intensive distribution
services. This way of modelling vertical relationships among ￿rms located in diﬀerent markets
yields several novel results, helping to reconcile theoretical predictions with key stylized facts
1See Rogoﬀ [1996] for an excellent survey on the evidence on the failure of the law of one price. Although this
law also fails to hold within national boundaries, the deviations are much more dramatic at the international
level ￿ which has led some researchers to posit a speci￿c￿ b o r d e re ﬀect￿ (i.e. the eﬀect of switching currencies
across jurisdictions) on the prices of tradables (see Engel and Rogers [1996]).
2According to the evidence surveyed by Goldberg and Knetter [1997], 1/2 is the median fraction by which
exporters to the US oﬀset a dollar appreciation by lowering their export prices.
3Krugman [1987] labeled the phenomenon of exchange-rate-induced price discrimination ￿pricing-to-market￿.
Overall, the average degree of pricing-to-market found by Marston￿s [1990] classic study of Japanese industries is
in the neighborhood of 50 percent. Similar ￿ndings are in Knetter [1989, 1993] and Gagnon and Knetter [1995].
4In his analysis of US exchange rate movements, using both consumer and producer price indices, Engel
[1999] ￿nds that a great deal of the amount of deviations from purchasing power parity are due to a failure of
the law of one price for internationally traded goods.
1of the international economy.5
First, deviations from the law of one price at both wholesale and retail levels in our model
derive endogenously from optimal pricing by monopolistic ￿rms. Whereas most contributions
in the literature simply rule out arbitrage in the goods market, we characterize optimal price
discrimination under the constraint that prices should not provide opportunities for arbitrage
across wholesalers and retailers in diﬀerent market locations. Second, because of optimal cross-
border price discrimination, exchange-rate pass-through is incomplete ￿ its degree depending
on the type of shocks hitting the economy. We use our model to derive general equilibrium
expressions for the exchange-rate pass-through into import and consumer prices, as a function
of exchange-rate and price elasticities. By doing so, we emphasize the diﬀerential impact of real
and monetary shocks on pass-through and the need for identifying the sources of exchange-rate
and price variability. Third, despite incomplete pass-through, nominal depreciations worsen
the terms of trade ￿ consistent with the empirical evidence stressed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
[2000] as well as the possibility of expenditure-switching eﬀects. Furthermore, nominal and
real exchange rates, positively correlated in equilibrium, are generally more volatile than fun-
damentals. Because of low equilibrium pass-through, however, large movements in the nominal
and real exchange rates translate into small changes in consumption, employment and price
levels.
In the tradition of international macroeconomics, distribution services are invoked as a key
reason for the failure of Purchasing Power Parity (henceforth PPP).6 Dornbusch [1989], for
5To enhance comparison with the literature our open economy model with endogenous price discrimination
builds on the analytical framework of Corsetti and Pesenti [2001a,b] and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [1995, 2000]. The
speci￿cation of consumption preferences in these models is such that terms-of-trade movements in response to
country-speci￿c shocks can be suﬃcient to generate optimal risk-sharing: introducing Arrow-Debreu securities
would not change the equilibrium allocation. This is no longer the case when we allow for distributive trade:
no equilibrium with trade in international bonds can lead to optimal risk sharing ￿ not even when nominal
rigidities and monopoly power distortions are removed.
6Recent literature has explored the role of barriers to trade and transportation costs, but without linking them
explicitly to international price discrimination. See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [2001] on the role of transportation costs
in explaining major puzzles in international ￿nance, and the evidence in Parsley and Wei [2001] on transportation
costs and the border eﬀect.
2instance, suggests that these services may provide an explanation for his ￿nding that the price
of an identical consumption basket is higher in high-income economies than in low-income ones.
Overall, distributive trade accounts for an important share of the retail price of consumption
goods: for the US, including wholesale and retail s e r v i c e s ,m a r k e t i n g ,a d v e r t i s e m e n ta n dl o c a l
transportation, the average distribution margin is as high as 50 percent (see Burstein, Neves
and Rebelo [2001]).
In recent years, a number of contributions have included distributive trade in open macro
models in order to account for the large diﬀerentials in consumer prices.7 In our work, we
take a step further relative to the existing literature. Namely, we analyze market segmenta-
tion resulting from the vertical interaction among monopolistic producers and retailers, and
derive its implications for the degree of exchange-rate pass-through into import and consumer
prices. We are motivated by the strong evidence of the importance of distribution services
in accounting for international price discrimination ￿ such as the one presented by Goldberg
and Verboven [2001]. Based on comprehensive and detailed data of automobile prices in ￿ve
European countries, these authors show that a 1 percent change in the nominal exchange rate
induces a 0.46 percent adjustment in the export prices in exporter currency (i.e., equivalent to
a0 . 5 4p a s s - t h r o u g hc o e ﬃcient). Of this, between 0.37 and 0.39 percent can be attributed to a
change in local costs (i.e., nominal wages in the destination country).8
Our approach also diﬀers from recent contributions that view market segmentation exclu-
sively as an implication of price rigidities. In such literature, foreign exporters preset consumer
prices in local currency.9 It has been shown that models following this approach can account
7Erceg and Levin [1995], McCallum and Nelson [1999], and Burstein, Neves and Rebelo [2001] assume that
distribution requires local inputs, focusing on the case of perfect competition in the goods market.
8Goldberg and Verboven [2001] estimate that local costs account for up to 35 per cent of the price of a car,
mainly due to distribution services provided by local dealers.
9An incomplete list of papers assuming local currency prices includes Betts and Devereux [2000], Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan [2000], Devereux and Engel [2000], and Kollman [1997], among others (see Engel [2002]
for a survey of the literature, and Corsetti and Pesenti [2001b] for a generalization of this approach). Early
contributions simply assumed that foreign exporters quote prices in local currency. Recent works by Bacchetta
and van Wincoop [2000], Corsetti and Pesenti [2002] and Devereux and Engel [2001] analyze the problem of
producers who can choose whether to preset prices in domestic currency only or in both domestic and foreign
currencies.
3for price diﬀerences across markets, the border eﬀect, and exchange rate volatility. Yet they
can do so only at the cost of predicting that an exchange rate depreciation improve a country￿s
terms of trade ￿ in contrast with the evidence in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [2000].10
The paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the model. Section
3 discusses optimal pricing by monopolistic ￿rms facing country-speci￿c demand elasticities.
Section 4 derives general equilibrium implications for the exchange rate pass-through into
import and consumer prices. Section 5 presents the novel features of the equilibrium with
endogenously segmented markets, analyzing the link between exchange-rate determination and
the behavior of relative prices. Section 6 concludes.
The world economy consists of two countries of equal size,  and . Each country specializes in
one type of tradable good, produced in a number of varieties or brands de￿ned over a continuum
of unit mass. Brands of tradable goods are indexed by  [01] in the Home country and
 [01] in the Foreign country. In addition, each country produces an array of diﬀerentiated
nontradable goods, indexed by  [01]. Nontraded goods are either consumed or used to make
intermediate tradable goods  and  available to domestic consumers.
Firms producing tradable and nontradable goods are monopolistic suppliers of one brand
of goods only. These ￿rms employ diﬀerentiated domestic labor inputs in a continuum of unit
mass. Each worker occupies a point in this continuum, and acts as a monopolistic supplier of a
diﬀerentiated type of labor input to all ￿rms in the domestic economy. Households/workers are
indexed by  [01] in the Home country and ∗ [01] in the Foreign country. Firms operating
in the distribution sector, by contrast, are assumed to operate under perfect competition.11
They buy tradable goods and distribute them to consumers using nontraded goods as the only
input in production.
10Another approach to modelling price discrimination (clearly complementary to ours) consists of introducing
non-constant elasticity preferences ￿ see the recent work by Bergin and Feenstra [2001] on the persistence of
real exchange rates following monetary shocks.
11Due to this assumption, we note from the start that the equilibrium allocation studied below would be
identical in a vertically integrated economy, where exporters with monopoly power own local retailers.
4In our baseline model, we allow for nominal rigidities by assuming that workers and ￿rms
agree on the nominal wage rate one period in advance.12 In what follows, we describe our set up
focusing on the Home country, with the understanding that similar expressions also characterize
the Foreign economy ￿ whereas variables referred to Foreign ￿rms and households are marked
with an asterisk.
Technology Let  () denote total output of a diﬀerentiated tradable good ,a n d	()
the demand for labor input of type  by the producer of good . By the same token,  ()
denotes total production of a diﬀerentiated nontradable good ,a n d	() the corresponding





















where  is the elasticity of substitution among labor inputs, which is the same across sectors,
and 
 denotes stochastic productivity parameters, which are sector-speci￿c. Similar expres-
sions hold for ￿rms in the Foreign country, whereas the elasticity of substitution is also , but
the productivity shocks are not necessarily symmetric.
Our speci￿cation of the distribution sector is in the spirit of the factual remark by Tirole
([1995], page 175) that ￿production and retailing are complements, and consumers often con-
sume them in ￿xed proportions￿. As in Erceg and Levin [1995] and Burstein, Neves and Rebelo
[2001], we thus assume that bringing one unit of traded goods to consumers requires 
 units of












We note here that the Dixit-Stiglitz index above also applies to the consumption of diﬀeren-
tiated nontraded goods, speci￿ed in the next subsection. In equilibrium, then, the basket of
12Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [2001] and Smets and Wouters [2001] are recent structural models
providing convincing evidence that wage stickiness is an important determinant of macroeconomic ￿uctuations.
Here we abstract from issues in in￿ation dynamics that could be analyzed, for instance, by assuming Calvo-style
adjustment of prices or wages. See Kollman [1997] and Chari et al. [2000] among others.
5nontraded goods required to distribute tradable goods to consumers will have the same compo-
sition as the basket of nontradable goods consumed by the representative domestic household.13











where 1 is the discount rate and the instantaneous utility is a function of a consumption
index (), to be de￿ned below, real balances  (),a n dl a b o re ﬀort (). Instantaneous
utility is state-dependent, as we potentially allow for velocity shocks in the form of a stochas-
tically varying utility of real balances, and shocks to the disutility of labor.
Households consume all types of (domestically-produced) nontraded goods, and both types
of traded goods. So () is consumption of brand  of Home nontraded good by agent  at
time ; ()a n d() are the same agent￿s consumption of Home brand  and Foreign
brand . For each type of good, we assume that one brand is an imperfect substitute for all
other brands, with constant elasticity of substitution 1. Consumption of Home and Foreign


































13For simplicity, we do not distinguish between nontradable consumption goods, which directly enter the
agents￿ utility, and nontraded distribution services, which are jointly consumed with traded goods. This distinc-
tion may however be important in more empirically oriented studies (e.g., see MacDonald and Ricci [2001]). By
the same token, we ignore distribution costs incurred in the non-traded good market, as these can be accounted
for by varying the level of productivity in the nontradable sector.
6As in Corsetti and Pesenti [2001a], the parameters describing consumption preferences are the
same in the Home and Foreign country.14
Price indexes Let ()a n d∗
()d e n o t et h eretail price of brand  expressed in the Home



















The price indexes N ∗
N F and ∗
F, are analogously de￿ned. The utility-based price
























Household budget constraints and asset markets Home agents hold Home currency ,
two international bonds,  H and  F, respectively denominated in Home and Foreign currency,
and a well-diversi￿ed portfolio of domestic equities. They earn labor income !and pay non-
distortionary (lump-sum) net taxes ", denominated in Home currency. The individual ￿ow
budget constraint for agent  in the Home country is:15









!()() "() HH() FF() NN()
where  is the nominal exchange rate, expressed as Home currency per unit of Foreign currency;
# and #∗
 are the nominal yields in Home and Foreign currency, paid at the beginning of period
14Consistent with the assumption that each country specializes in the production of a single type of traded
good, the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in diﬀerent countries (set equal to one) is below the
elasticity of substitution among goods produced in one country (1).
15The notation conventions follow Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [1996, ch.10]. Speci￿cally, () denotes agent ￿s
nominal balances accumulated during period  and carried over into period  +1 ,w h i l eH()a n dF()
denote agent ￿s bonds accumulated during period  − 1a n dc a r r i e do v e ri n t op e r i o d.
7 but known at time  1; and Π()+ Π() is the agent￿s share of pro￿ts from all
￿rms  and  in the economy.
The international bonds are assumed to be in zero net supply, so that in the aggregate
 H =  ∗
H and  F =  ∗
F.
Government budget constraint and policy instruments The government budget con-






"() =0  (8)
We abstract from government spending; seigniorage revenue is rebated to households in a








Given the time path of $, there is a corresponding sequence of Home nominal interest rates.
We assume that monetary authorities can credibly commit to monetary rules and price level
targets, and without loss of generality, aﬀect the stock of Home monetary assets by controlling
the short-term rate #+1: Home monetary easing at time  leading to a lower #+1 is associated
with a higher $.16
3.1 Firms￿ optimization and optimal price discrimination
International price discrimination is a key feature of the international economy captured by
our model. In what follows we show that, even if Home and Foreign consumers have identical
constant-elasticity preferences for consumption, the need for distribution services intensive in
16With logarithmic utility, in equilibrium  is equal to nominal spending 	. Note that, solving forward
the above equation, the Home monetary stance at any  is a function of current and future expected interest
rates, and the expected level of nominal spending in the in￿nite future, discounted at the rate 
. We assume
that policy rules are such that the latter term does not diverge asymptotically.
8local nontraded goods implies that the elasticity of demand for the  () brand at wholesale
level be not generally the same across markets. Firms will thus want to charge diﬀerent prices
at Home and in the Foreign country. We will focus our analysis on Home ￿rms ￿ optimal
pricing by Foreign ￿rms can be easily derived from it.
Consider ￿rst the optimal pricing problem faced by ￿rms producing nontradables for the





















Note that nominal wage rigidities do not translate into price rigidities: the price of the non-
traded good () in fact moves inversely with productivity in the sector.
Now, let ()d e n o t et h ep r i c eo fb r a n d expressed in the Home currency, at producer
level. With a competitive distribution sector, the consumer price of good  is simply
()=()+
N (12)
I nt h ec a s eo f￿rms producing tradables, ￿pricing to market￿ derives endogenously from the
solution to the problem of the Home representative ￿rm in the sector:




























































9Unlike the case of nontraded goods (11), in this case the markups charged by the Home ￿rms
include a state-contingent component ￿ in brackets in the above expression ￿ that varies
as a function of productivity shocks, monetary innovations (aﬀecting the exchange rate) and























Since in general '(H will not equal to '(H∗, the optimal wholesale price of tradable goods
will not obey the law of one price (ﬂ () = ﬂ ∗
()). To understand this result, observe
that, despite CES preferences, the elasticity of the demand for the Home goods faced by the
upstream monopolist will be diﬀerent at Home and abroad, re￿ecting any asymmetry in relative
productivity and/or relative wages. In the Home market, the price elasticity of the demand for























In the export market the price elasticity of the demand for the good  depends on productivity








































Home monopolistic ￿r m st a k ea c c o u n to ft h ei m p l i c a t i o n so fd i s t r i b u t i v et r a d eo nt h ed e m a n d
elasticity for their product, and ￿nd it optimal to charge diﬀerent prices to ￿rms distributing
in the Home and in the Foreign market.
It is worth stressing three properties of the above elasticities. First, the price elasticity of
export demand is non linear in the exchange rate: a relatively appreciated Home currency (a low
) corresponds to a relatively large price elasticity. Second, such elasticity is increasing in the
wholesale price ￿ as shown by the literature on international trade, this is a suﬃcient condition
for incomplete exchange-rate pass-through (we will discuss this topic in detail below).17
17As far as the elasticity of substitution between the tradable good and the nontradable bundle in the retailer
distribution technology is less than 1, the producer￿s price elasticity will be increasing in ﬂ 
∗()

10Third, let +()( +∗
()) denote the distribution margin, i.e., the share of distributive trade
in the consumer price of the good  i nt h eH o m e( F o r e i g n )m a r k e t .T h ea b o v ee x p r e s s i o n sc a n
then be written as follows
)















The elasticities of consumption to the wholesale prices are monotonic functions of the dis-
tribution margins. In either market, the higher the distribution margin, the lower the price
elasticity. Note that when 
 =0 ,+ = 0 and the above expressions are equal to the constant .
3.2 The role of arbitrage across national markets
Most open macro models accounting for deviations from the law of one price simply rule
out arbitrage in the goods market by assumption. In our framework, we can actually say
something about the role of arbitrage as a constraint on ￿rms￿ pricing decisions. Speci￿cally,
we can analyze ￿rms￿ optimal pricing decisions allowing for the possibility of arbitrage across
wholesale and retail markets.18
In the previous section we have derived (15) and (16) under the assumption that no agents
in the economy could arbitrage across market location. In this section, we study the extent
to which arbitrage in the goods market may prevent optimal price discrimination between
domestic and foreign dealers. Consider the consumer price of the good  in both markets,
calculated adding the distribution costs (
N and 
∗∗




































18We are assuming that markets can be segmented along national lines. In our model this could be easily
justi￿ed with a system of selective and exclusive distribution, in which the manufacturer can choose dealers and
restrain them from reselling to anyone but end-users. We observe here that regulation 123/85 of the European
Commission has allowed these practices in the European Union to some extent (see Goldberg and Verboven
[2001] for the implications of the Regulation in the European car market).
11If the representative Home ￿rm set the wholesale price in the Foreign country above the con-
sumer price of its own good in the Home country, ￿rms distributing good  in the Foreign
country would ￿nd it pro￿table to buy it from Home retailers rather than in the wholesale
market. This implies that optimal price discrimination is possible only as long as the following
no-arbitrage conditions are veri￿ed:
∗



















According to this expression, for given relative nominal marginal costs in the nontraded goods
sector, a large depreciation of the nominal exchange rate could reduce the Home consumer
price of  in Foreign currency below the optimal export price ∗
() ￿ violating the second
inequality above. In that case, arbitrage in the goods market would force ￿rms to set the
domestic price and the foreign wholesale price equal to each other: ()= ﬂ ∗
(). By the
same token, a large appreciation of the exchange rate could reduce the foreign retail price of
 in the Home currency below the wholesale price at Home. In this case, ruling out arbitrage
requires ￿rms to set ﬂ ()= ∗
().
Leaving the characterization of optimal pricing subject to the no-arbitrage condition (23)
to the Appendix, we provide an intuitive account of our main results. Suppose that to rule out
arbitrage Home ￿rms must set: ()= ﬂ ∗
(). Relative to the optimal prices (15) and (16),
Home ￿rms will now raise ﬂ () above (15) while lowering ﬂ ∗
()b e l o w( 1 6 ) .A st h et w op r i c e s
cannot be set independently, the drop in the markup in the foreign market is partly oﬀset by
a higher markup at home. Note that, when the no-arbitrage condition is binding, wholesale
prices will be diﬀerent in the Home and Foreign markets: with 
0, the law of one price
cannot hold.
It is easy to verify that, holding (23), it can never be pro￿table to buy good  at the Home
(Foreign) retail price and sell it at the Foreign (Home) retail price after paying local distribution
costs. We note here that, to the extent that domestic households need local distribution services
12even if they buy tradables abroad (i.e., technical assistance), our model endogenously rules out
consumers￿ arbitrage across retail markets.
In concluding this section, it is appropriate to discuss brie￿y our assumption of perfect
competition in the distribution sector. Allowing for monopoly power in the retail sector would
imply double marginalization at consumer prices. In our setup, however, monopolistic retailers
face a constant-elasticity demand, so that their markup over marginal cost would be constant
(the right hand side of (12) would be multiplied by the constant 
−1). Thus, double marginal-
ization would in￿uence the level of consumer prices (both (21) and (22) would be multiplied
by 
−1), but not their wholesale counterpart (15) and (16). For this reason, the equilibrium
response of prices to nominal and real shocks would not be substantially diﬀerent from what we
obtain in our model, built on the simplest benchmark speci￿cation of monopolistic wholesale
suppliers and competitive distributors.
The empirical evidence on pass-through unambiguously shows that prices tend to vary far less
than one-to-one with exchange rates. Yet the exchange-rate elasticity of prices can hardly be
considered a constant parameter, as it may depend on a variety of factors including market
structure, price adjustment costs and, most crucially, on the nature of shocks hitting the
economy. In this section, we use our model to derive general equilibrium expressions for the
exchange-rate pass-through into import prices and consumer prices, as a function of equilibrium
exchange-rate and price elasticities. By doing so, we are able to trace the diﬀerential impact of
real and monetary shocks on pass-through, showing the importance of identifying the source
of exchange-rate and price variability.
Since we focus on symmetric equilibria within a country (though not necessarily symmetric
across countries), from now on we will write prices with country-speci￿c, rather than ￿rm-
speci￿c indexes, e.g., f rather ﬂ (), dropping the indices  and ∗ and interpreting all
variables in per-capita (or aggregate) terms.
13Exchange-rate pass-through in response to nominal and real shocks In addition to
explaining price discrimination, the combination of distribution costs and monopoly power has
crucial implications for the optimal degree of exchange-rate pass-through. Assume at ￿rst that
the no-arbitrage condition (23) is satis￿ed as a strict inequality. By taking the total diﬀerential
of the analog of (16) for the Home import prices f, we obtain a general expression for the








Ef ('(f 1) )−1
En  (24)












This expression makes clear that the exchange-rate pass-through critically hinges on the
nature of the shocks hitting the economy, for in general equilibrium each shock will result in a
diﬀerent impact on the nominal exchange rate and thus on the elasticities appearing in (24).
Consider ￿rst the eﬀect of monetary policy shocks, so that obviously )−1
Ef = )−1
En =0 .
The exchange-rate pass-through into import prices will be equal to '(−1
f, the inverse of the
contingent component of the markup charged by Foreign producers to local distributors. Since
'(−1
f  1, pass-through will be less than complete. For instance, with a state contingent
markup of 25 percent, a one percent exchange-rate depreciation conditional on a domestic
monetary shock would result in a 0.8 percent increase in import prices, i.e., in a 80 percent pass-
through. Moreover, pass-through will be decreasing in any variable that raises the equilibrium
markup charged by Foreign ￿rms in the Home market ￿ including a higher degree of monopoly
power (a lower ), or a larger distribution margin (a larger 
).20 Similarly, it will be smaller in
19For simplicity, in (24) we write out (the inverse of) elasticities with the implicit convention that they are
zero if the corresponding shock does not materialize in the economy.
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With wage contracts E = ∗
 E =0 
 Without wage contracts, nominal shocks would not alter relative
wages (the exchange rate and the wage rate would move in the same direction). In this case, following a
domestic (foreign) expansionary shock to  (), E =  =1( 0 )a n d∗
 E =0( −1). It is easy to
see that exchange rate pass-through will be either complete or zero, depending on the origin of the monetary
14case of a currency appreciation (a smaller ), higher in case of depreciation. Monetary shocks
thus may induce asymmetries in the exchange rate elasticity )fE.
What about the degree of pass-through resulting from productivity shocks? It is apparent
from (24) that shocks to 
h and 
∗
n will result in the same equilibrium pass-through as
monetary shocks, '(−1
f,f o rt h et e r mi nb r a c k e t sw i l lb ee q u a lt o1i nt h e s ec a s e sa sw e l l .
Conversely, the exchange-rate pass-through due to shocks to 
f and 
n will generally be
diﬀerent from '(−1
f, depending on the equilibrium response of the exchange rate to these
shocks ￿ i.e., on the exchange-rate elasticities )Ef and )En. Observe that these elasticities
can have either sign. Thus, while pass-through will be equal to '(−1




n, it can be higher or lower than '(−1
f in the presence of shocks to domestic
nontradables 
n, and foreign tradables 
f. But the stronger the response of the nominal
exchange rate  to productivity shocks (i.e., the lower )−1
Ef and )−1
En), the closer the
exchange-rate pass-through to '(−1
f.
It is worth stressing that the implications of real shocks for incomplete pass-through are in
general independent of nominal rigidities. Even if all prices and wages were fully ￿exible, ￿rms
may still choose to discriminate prices optimally in response to productivity diﬀerentials across
sectors, as well as wage diﬀerentials arising from country-speci￿c shocks to labor supply.
Finally, allowing for arbitrage between the retail and the wholesale markets cannot but
reinforce our results. In the previous section we have shown that, when the exchange-rate
depreciation is large enough, Home ￿rms will set the foreign wholesale price equal to the
domestic consumer price. To the extent that shocks cause Home ￿r m st or a i s et h eH o m ep r i c e
of their goods, the degree of pass-through will clearly be even lower than that implicit in (16).
Muted eﬀects on consumer prices The presence of distribution costs further reduces the
exchange-rate pass-through into prices at consumer level. Consider the exchange-rate elasticity
of the Foreign good retail prices in the Home market:
)fE =( 1 +f))fE +f)−1
En (25)
shock. For instance, a Home shock that raises all prices in domestic currency and depreciates the exchange rate
proportionally will also result in higher import prices.
15where


























For any given exchange-rate pass-through )fE, a larger distribution margin +f translates
into smaller movements of consumer prices )fE. In the case of shocks to Home nontradables
causing )En  0, the above elasticity is reduced further, as it also re￿ects falling prices in
the distribution sector operating in the Home market.
Note that the elasticity )fE in (25) is less than one even if the exchange-rate pass-through
into import prices is complete. Indeed, some contributions (such as Burstein et al. [2001]) build
models assuming the law of one price at wholesale level (and thus )fE =1 )i nr e s p o n s et o
any kind of shocks, and attribute imperfect pass-through into consumer prices exclusively to
the direct eﬀect of distribution.

















h +( 1 +f)'(−1
f )−1
En
The CPI response to exchange rate ￿uctuations crucially depends on three factors: (i) openness,
namely the share of imports in consumption

2
(in turn depending on the share of tradables in
consumption , and the share of imports in tradables,
1
2
); (ii) the size of markup '(−1
h and
'(−1
f; (iii) the size of the distribution margins +h and +f.21
However, an assessment of (conditional and unconditional) movements in the CPI associ-
ated to exchange-rate ￿uctuations in general equilibrium is by no means trivial. Shocks may
move consumer prices diﬀerently, even in opposite direction, with respect to the exchange rate
and import prices. This suggests caution in deriving structural interpretations from average,
unconditional estimates of price elasticities, say, as indicators of ￿exchange rate disconnect￿, or
in using them to draw conclusions about the in￿ationary consequences of particular episodes
of exchange-rate variability.
21Most contributions in the recent open-economy literature focus on either (i), e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [2000],
or (ii), e.g. LCP, setting (iii) to zero. Burstein et al. [2001] focus on (i) and (iii) but abstract from (ii).
16However, an assessment of the general equilibrium conditional and unconditional move-
ments in the CPI associated with exchange-rate ￿uctuations is by no means trivial, as some
shocks may move domestic prices by more and even in the opposite direction with respect to
the exchange rate.
This suggests caution in carrying out inference on the eﬀects of exchange-rate movements
based on empirical views of the unconditional CPI elasticity to exchange-rate movements.
































In our model, movements in the real exchange rate are due both to diﬀerences in prices (in
the same currency) of traded goods across countries and to movements of the relative price of
tradables in terms of nontradables.22 This is in sharp contrast with models adopting a similar
speci￿cation, but not allowing for distributive trade. By setting 
 = 0, in fact, there would be
no deviation from the law of one price (henceforth LOOP). The ￿rst term on the right-hand
side of the above de￿nition would be constant, and the variability of the real exchange rate
would only depend on the variability of the relative price of nontradables within each country
￿ a prediction that is inconsistent with the ￿ndings for the US real exchange rate in Engel
[1999].




￿ denoting relative LOOP
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22Since tradables have equal shares in Home and Foreign consumption baskets, terms of trade movements do
not impinge on the real exchange rate.





























 =0 ,+ =0a n d'( = 1 for all goods, and the right hand side of the above
expression will be equal to zero: there will be no deviations from the law of one price. With

0, instead, the relative deviation from LOOP conditional on nominal shocks will be equal to
1 )fE, which is the complement to one of the exchange-rate pass-through into the consumer
price of imports. Relative to the case of nominal shocks, LOOP deviations conditional on
productivity shocks can be lower (for shocks to 
∗
n), roughly the same (for shocks to 
f and

h), or larger (for shocks to 
n).
Having set the stage for a general equilibrium analysis of price discrimination and pass-
through, we are now ready to characterize the equilibrium solution of our model, and discuss
its main predictions and properties. To this we turn next.
5.1 Characterizing the model solution
The world equilibrium is characterized as follows. Given the stochastic processes driving mone-
tary stances ($ and $∗




), and given the initial holdings of bonds ( H0 and  F0) and money (0 and ∗
0),f o r
 0 the equilibrium (symmetric across ￿rms) is a set of processes for the nominal exchange
rate  t h eH o m ea l l o c a t i o n sa n dp r i c e s( , H F N +1  H+1  F+1, H 
∗
H












 ) that (a) satisfy the Home and Foreign consumers￿ optimality conditions,
(b) maximize ￿rms pro￿ts, (c) satisfy the market clearing conditions for each asset and each
good, in all the markets where it is traded, and (d) satisfy the resource constraints.

































































































































































































































































19Table 1 presents a subset of equilibrium conditions that completely characterize the model.
In the table, ﬂ -+1 denotes Home non-monetary wealth at the beginning of time  +1 ,i . e . ,
ﬂ -+1 (1 + #+1) H+1 +( 1+#∗
+1) +1 F+1; (37)
-
∗ is similarly de￿ned. Equations (30) state the risk-adjusted uncovered interest parity condi-
tion, where we have used the fact that in equilibrium $ =  and $∗
 = ∗
 ∗
 . Equation (31)
is the bond market-clearing equation, while (32) is the current account. These three equations
simultaneously determine the nominal exchange rate and external borrowing. Employment
and consumption in both countries (corresponding to the expressions (33), (35), (34) and (36))
can then be derived as a function of exogenous shocks, wages and the nominal exchange rate.
In each country, the nominal wage rate (28) (or (29)) is preset given the joint distribution of
employment,  (or ∗) and domestic monetary shocks.
In the Appendix, we show that our economy can have multiple non-stochastic steady states,
for (perhaps too) large values of the distribution margin. Speci￿cally, we show that the steady
state can be characterized by either one or three equilibrium allocations. In the latter case,
identical fundamentals may correspond to vastly diﬀerent equilibrium values for the exchange
rate and the terms of trade ￿ although the cross-border diﬀerences in the price level, consump-
tion and employment would be small. In this paper we abstract from steady state multiplicity
by restricting parameters￿ values to the region where the equilibrium is unique ￿ and leave a
detail analysis of this issue to future research.
It is useful to note here that, despite nominal wage rigidities, in our economy there exists a
simple monetary rule that can sustain a ￿ex-price, ￿ex-wage allocation ￿ obtained from Table
1 by evaluating the optimal wage rates (28) and (29) without the expectation operator. Let $











where Γ and Γ∗
 are deterministic functions of time (therefore uniquely pinned down at time
 1), scaling the level of wages in the economy. Following the above rules monetary authorities
tightens in those states of the world when the disutility of working is higher. As monetary policy
in either country completely stabilizes the marginal disutility of working, according to (28) and
20(29) workers will ￿nd it optimal to set a nominal wage equal to Γ( 1) and Γ∗
( 1). It
is easy to check that this is exactly the ￿exible wage that would result when (38) is implemented.
It follows that the above monetary rules support the ￿exible-wage allocation.23
5.2 Equilibrium with distribution services
Distribution services play a key role in diﬀerentiating our results relative to competing models,
and improve the overall performance of our speci￿cation in accounting for key stylized facts
of the international economy. We have already noted above that they are responsible for
generating deviations from the law of one price and incomplete pass-through. In what follows
we stress some additional distinctive features of our speci￿cation.
For our purposes, it is analytically convenient to focus ￿rst on the extreme case of ￿nancial
autarky. Under this assumption, the exchange rate is implicitly determined by the balanced
trade condition (  ﬂ ∗
H∗
H = ﬂ FF) as a non-linear function of relative monetary policy


























































The exchange rate depends not only on relative monetary stance, but also on the share of
foreign producers in Home import prices, relative to the share of domestic exporters in import
prices abroad.
It can be easily shown that in the presence of a full set of contingent nominal bonds, i.e.,




23This result shows that market segmentation due to distributive trade does not prevent the possibility that
monetary policy rules may sustain the allocation without nominal rigidities. As shown by Corsetti and Pesenti
[2001b], however, this is impossible when market segmentation and incomplete pass-through can be attributed to
￿local currency pricing￿ or price adjustment costs in local currency. Because of ineﬃcient risk sharing, however,
the ￿ex-wage allocation will in general not be Pareto eﬃcient.










when our speci￿cation becomes similar to Corsetti and Pesenti [2001a], Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
[2000] and Devereux and Engel [2000]. So, if we assume either that markets are complete,
or that there are no distribution costs, the exchange rate in our speci￿cation would move in
proportion to relative monetary stances, with two crucial consequences. First,  would respond
to real shocks in the economy only through endogenous changes in the relative monetary policy
stance $$∗
, and not directly. Second, the volatility of the nominal exchange rate would
coincide with that of nominal shocks ￿ so that the model could not generate any excess
volatility.
Our speci￿cation with distributive trade, instead, has important implications for interna-













hence the elasticity of the imports demand with respect to the wholesale price F is decreasing












By the de￿nition of +F,t h i se x p r e s s i o ni sd e c r e a s i n gi n
, and equal to 1 for 
 = 0. Distribution
services thus reduce the price elasticity of imports demand, below what is implied by Cobb-
Douglas preferences. But by lowering the price elasticity of imports, distributive trade induces
larger price movements for any given quantity change not only under ￿nancial autarky but also
with incomplete markets.24
5.3 The international transmission mechanism
In this subsection, we will show that the exchange rate in our economy tends to move more
than the underlying economic fundamentals, and its movements pass through into prices only
24For an analysis of these issues in a quantitative framework see Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [2002].
22partially. Second, notwithstanding incomplete pass-through and deviations from LOOP, nom-
inal depreciations tend to worsen the terms of trade. Finally, nominal and real exchange rates
are positively correlated in equilibrium and thus the volatility of the former is inherited by the
latter.
To derive these results, in this subsection we keep our early assumption of ￿nancial autarky
￿ so that, as shown above, the exchange rate is given by (40). Under this assumption, we










$ across countries. In the next subsection, we will show that the results
derived under ￿nancial autarky carry through to an economy with international trade in a
nominal bond.
Exchange-rate volatility and pass-through Consider the response of the nominal ex-
change rate to monetary policy shocks, in the form of unexpected changes in the ratio of $ to






where '(t and + denote the symmetric steady values of (17) and of the distribution margin,
respectively. Under mild conditions on the relative size of markups and distribution margins,25
the coeﬃcient multiplying the relative monetary shock in the above equation is always positive
and larger than one ￿ i.e., a Home monetary expansion leads to more than a proportional
currency depreciation.26
In response to real productivity shocks, the exchange rate jumps to its new equilibrium
25Note that when t − 20, the conditions for the existence of multiple steady states derived in the
appendix do not hold.
26With ￿nancial autarky, in the long run the nominal exchange rate moves one-to-one with relative monetary
stances. As all prices are ex-ante ￿exible, money is neutral: relative wages do not respond to anticipated
monetary innovations. Interestingly, then, a permanent monetary expansion depreciates on impact the nominal
exchange rate by more than its long-run value, generating expectations of appreciation in the future. This result
however is not comparable to Dornbusch￿s overshooting. Without trade in ￿nancial assets uncovered interest













The response to shocks to the traded and the nontraded sector has the same sign: the nominal
exchange rate depreciates with any domestic productivity shock and appreciates with any
Foreign shock. Intuitively, a positive shock to productivity in the Home tradable sector leads
to a nominal depreciation because such shock reduces the wholesale price of the Home goods
in the Foreign market. Although the retail price also falls, raising Foreign demand, the value
of exports drops: for a given value of Home imports, balanced trade in equilibrium requires
a depreciation of the currency (the less elastic the demand for imports, the larger the rate
of depreciation). By the same token, a positive productivity shock to the Home nontradable
sector reduces unit distribution costs in the Home market, increasing the price elasticity of
Home demand for imports: import prices tend to fall. However, because of falling distribution
costs, retail prices fall by more, boosting Home import demand. Thus, the exchange rate must
depreciate to ensure a zero trade balance. Note that the size of exchange rate movements in
response to productivity shocks is ampli￿ed when 
 and  are relatively high.27
These results shed light on the eﬀects of productivity shocks on exchange-rate pass-through,
discussed in the previous section. In particular, note that under ￿nancial autarky, the exchange-
rate elasticities to shocks to the traded and the nontraded sector are the same, namely )Eh =




. Using expression (24), then, it is easy to verify that
for a given size of productivity shocks, pass-through into import prices will be higher when the
underlying productivity shock hits domestic nontradables, relative to the case when the shock
hits Foreign tradables. Interestingly, however, the response of consumer prices to exchange-
rate ￿uctuations can follow diﬀerent patterns. From (25) it is apparent that for +F 05,
pass-through at consumer prices will be lower in response to shocks to 
N, than to shocks to

F.
27When the distribution margin is so high that the economy may exhibit multiple equilibria, the response of
the exchange rate to nominal and real shocks may change sign even for equilibria that are in a neighborhood of
the symmetric steady state. Clearly, for values of the parameters close to those that make the sign switch, the
exchange rate becomes extremely volatile.
24Finally, looking at (26), the consumer price index will be more insulated from the exchange
rate if nominal depreciations are brought about by shocks to (domestic and foreign) trad-
ables, rather than by nominal shocks and shocks to 
∗
N.T h eo v e r a l le ﬀect of exchange-rate
￿uctuations arising from disturbances to 
N is ambiguous and will depend on markups and
distribution margins across sectors.
The volatility of nominal and real exchange rates Linearizing the real exchange rate








where  is given by (42). Since 0 1, this expression shows that monetary shocks always
move nominal and real exchange rates in the same direction. Thus, an unexpected monetary
expansion at home will bring about both a nominal and a real depreciation. However, since
the coeﬃcient of  in the above expression is less than one, the nominal exchange rate will
move by less.
With respect to shocks to tradables the expression for the real exchange rate is the same







 1+   (45)
where in both cases  is given by (43). We have seen above that, regardless of the sector
in which they occur, domestic productivity shocks always depreciate the domestic currency in
nominal terms. It is then apparent from the above expressions that they also depreciate it in
real terms. Observe that the real depreciation will be attenuated in the case of shocks to 
H
relative to the case of shocks to 
N.28
Exchange rate and terms of trade comovements Consider now the link between nominal
exchange rate movements and the terms of trade. Linearizing the latter around a symmetric
28This result runs against the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis that shocks to tradables should appreciate the real
exchange rate via an increase in the relative price of nontradables. However, the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis
assumes away any terms-of-trade eﬀect, positing that tradables are perfect substitute across countries.

























where  is given by either (42) or (43), depending on the nature of the shock. Under mild
conditions on the degree of monopoly power and distribution margins, such that 
 1, the
coeﬃcient of  in the above expression is positive. Hence, monetary shocks induce a positive
correlation between the terms of trade and the exchange rate.
The correlation between the terms of trade and the nominal exchange rate is also positive
in the presence of real shocks to productivity in the Home tradable sector. As these shocks
unambiguously depreciate the Home currency, they worsen the terms of trade both directly
(second term on the right-hand side of the expression above) and through their eﬀect on .
For this reason, it is possible that shocks to the tradable sector cause the terms of trade to be
more volatile than .
The correlation between and the terms of trade is not necessarily positive, however,
when the economy is hit by shocks to productivity to the Home nontradable sector. While
unambiguously depreciating the Home currency, these shocks also have a positive eﬀect on
the terms of trade. This is because, by reducing the cost of distributive trade in the Home
market, they raise the price elasticity of the Home demand for Foreign products, and a higher
price elasticity tends to lower the optimal price charged by Foreign wholesalers. Therefore, the
volatility of the terms of trade in response to shocks to nontradables tends to be lower than
the volatility of .
5.4 Numerical examples
To complete the analysis of the international transmission mechanism in our model, we now
reconsider the analytical results obtained under the extreme assumption of ￿nancial autarky,
by carrying out a numerical exercise under the assumption that agents can trade international
nominal bonds.29 Speci￿cally, we compute the impact eﬀects of nominal and real shocks, de-
29Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [2002] carry out extensive quantitative analysis of the model, using more general
speci￿cations of preferences and technology. Speci￿cally, that paper focuses on the lack of international risk-
26￿ned as a 1 percent deviation from their initial steady state values, allowing for both permanent
and temporary disturbances (lasting only one period).30
In our exercise, we assume that in both countries labor is twice as productive in the tradable
sector as in the nontradable sector ￿ namely, we set 

 =2 .T h ev a l u e so f
 and  are set to
0.625 and 6, such that the distribution margin is 50 percent￿ a number that is not far from
available estimates for the US and other OECD countries (see Burstein, Neves and Rebelo
[2001]), and the inverse of the steady state value of the state-contingent markup in (17) is 80
percent ￿ in line with the average exchange-rate pass-through into import prices across OECD
countries according to Campa and Goldberg [2003]. In turn, this implies plausible industry
markups, varying from 20 percent in the nontradable sector to 50 percent in the tradable sector.
Tradables and nontradables are given the same weight in consumption, i.e.,  =0 5. Using
the conditions derived in the appendix, it can be veri￿ed that these parameters values ensure
a unique steady state.
The results of our exercise are shown in Table 2, which reports, for each (monetary or
real) shock, the percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate, the real exchange rate, and
the terms of trade; the exchange-rate pass-through into import prices at both producer and
consumer levels; and the exchange rate elasticity of the CPI. Qualitatively, the equilibrium
response to shocks in the economies with trade in bonds are in line with our analysis in the
previous subsection.
Consider ￿rst the response of the nominal exchange rate to monetary shocks. As discussed
above, when markets are complete or there are no distribution costs, our speci￿cation implies
that the nominal exchange rate vary one-to-one with the relative monetary stance. With
incomplete markets and distribution costs, instead, the nominal and real exchange rate are
more volatile than the underlying shock. As shown in the table, a 1 percent temporary increase
sharing as exempli￿ed by the negative correlation of relative consumption and the real exchange rate ￿ the
so-called Backus and Smith [1993] anomaly.
30When trade in assets is limited to bonds, it is well known that the eﬀects of shocks on the wealth distribution
across countries will generate endogenous dynamics (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [1996], Chapter 10). Thus, we solve
for the equilibrium path assuming that after the shock the economy evolves under perfect foresight to its new
steady state, characterized by a diﬀerent world distribution of wealth.
27in $ ￿ equivalent to a 1 percentage point drop in the short-term nominal interest rate ￿
depreciates by 1.5 percent in the bond economy.31 Second, consistent with (43), the eﬀects
of innovations to 
H and 
N on the nominal and real exchange rate have comparable magnitude.
Relative to the case of ￿nancial autarky, however, in the bond economy temporary productivity
shocks have a much smaller impact than permanent shocks, against which bonds provide no
insurance. Finally, nominal and real exchange rates are positively correlated. In all but one
case (which is a temporary shock to the nontraded goods sector), a nominal depreciation of
the Home currency worsens the domestic terms of trade, raising the possibility of expenditure-
switching eﬀects from exchange rate movements.
To appreciate fully our results on exchange-rate pass-through (henceforth ERPT) shown
in the bottom half of Table 2, recall that the parameterization of the state-contingent markup
roughly implies a 80 percent pass-through into import prices conditional on nominal shocks.
A ￿rst result highlighted in the table is that pass-through is at most as high as 82 percent,
corresponding to shocks to tradables; it is lower for any of the other shocks.32
Re￿ecting a low degree of pass-through, our model predicts that, overall, domestic prices
m o v em u c hl e s st h a ni n t e r n a t i o n a lp r i c e s .F o l l o w i n ga1p e r c e n tn o m i n a ld e p r e c i a t i o n ,E R P T
onto consumer import prices is at most one half of ERPT on import prices, while CPI in￿ation
never exceeds 0.12 percent. This is remarkable in an economy with ￿exible prices: the CPI
response is even lower than the average estimates of 0.2 reported by Campa and Goldberg
[2003] for OECD countries. For instance, in response to an economy-wide permanent shock to
productivity the nominal exchange rate depreciates by more than 11.8 percent but in￿ation in
imports and overall CPI is only 4.1 and 0.3 percent, respectively.
However, the general equilibrium eﬀects on the CPI of exchange-rate ￿uctuations are by no
means obvious, since domestic prices can move by more, or in the opposite direction relative
31Under ￿nancial autarky, the exchange rate would instead depreciate by 5 per cent, as can be seen by making
use of (42). There is a large drop in the exchange rate volatility moving form ￿nancial autarky to the bond
economy. Under ￿nancial autarky, all trade has to be quid pro quo. Relative to the bond economy, the Home
country must thus export more and import less. But higher net exports in equilibrium require larger movements
in the terms of trade and in nominal and real exchange rates.
32Remarkably, this result would obtain also under a systematic monetary policy that replicates the ￿exible
price allocation, as the one in (38).
28to the exchange rate. For instance, nominal shocks and shocks to 
H w h e t h e ro rn o tp e r -
manent, all imply essentially the same exchange-rate pass-through into import prices, at both
producer level (around 80 percent) and consumer level (around 40 percent). Yet, pass-through
on CPI ranges between 12 percent and -32 percent! These numerical results question strong
interpretations of empirical estimates of average pass-through: as shown by our model, a fall
in domestic prices after an exchange rate depreciation is not necessarily a manifestation of a
￿disconnect￿ between the exchange rate and prices.
Finally, the table documents an interesting relation between ERPT into import prices and
the exchange-rate response to economy wide productivity shocks (to 
H and 
N combined).
Both the rate of currency depreciation and pass-through increase sharply when these shocks
are permanent, as opposed to temporary. This result implies that, for any given distribution
of shocks, pass-through should be increasing in the size of exchange-rate changes. But a
positive correlation between the degree of pass-through and the magnitude of exchange-rate
movements is also predicted by models viewing incomplete ERPT as an implication of the
presence of menu costs. In fact, given menu costs, one may expect the bene￿ts from changing
prices to be increasing in the magnitude of exchange rate movements. In our result, however,
price rigidities play no role and incomplete ERPT only re￿ects optimal price discrimination.
In the numerical exercises summarized by table 2, all percentage changes are measured with
respect to a symmetric steady state in which the law of one price holds by assumption. Shocks
cause deviations from the law of one price, whose relative size can be read from Table 2 as one
minus ERPT. Our model however can also account for deviations from the law of one price in
steady state, re￿ecting asymmetries in fundamentals across countries. For instance, suppose
that the productivity level in the tradable sector is 25 percent higher in the Home country than
in the Foreign country. With the higher supply of Home tradable goods, in steady state the
exchange rate and the terms of trade will be substantially weaker than in the previous example.
Most important, because of the implications of productivity diﬀerentials on the price elasticity
of the demand for Home goods, at wholesale level the Home goods will be 13 percent more
expensive in the export market than in the domestic market. At consumer level, the deviation
from the law of one price will be as high as 35 percent, larger than the productivity diﬀerential.
29Table 2: Impact Responses of Selected Variables to Nominal and Real Shocks
(Percentage deviations from steady-state values and elasticities)
Monetary Shock Shock to Tradables Shock to Nontradables Economy-wide Shock
Temporary Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary Permanent
Nominal exchange rate 1.5% 0.2% 5.9% 0.2% 5.7% 0.4% 11.8%
Real exchange rate 1.2% 0.2% 4.7% 1.0% 5.3% 1.6% 10.2%
Terms of trade 0.9% 1.0% 4.3% -0.1% 3.2% 0.9% 7.6%
Producer import price 1.2% 0.2% 4.7% -0.01% 4.3% 0.2% 9.3%
Consumer import price 0.6% 0.1% 2.4% -0.5% 1.7% -0.4% 4.1%
CPI 0.2% -0.1% 0.5% -0.8% -0.2% -0.8% 0.3%
ERPT :
Producer import price  fE 0.80 0.81 0.82 -0.06 0.76 0.36 0.78
Consumer import price fE 0.40 0.41 0.35 -2.20 0.30 -0.99 0.35
CPI E 0.12 -0.32 0.08 -3.34 -0.03 -1.87 0.02
See the main text for an explanation of the experiments
30Many recent contributions to the literature stress the importance of placing international price
diﬀerentials centerstage in open-macro models. In this paper we have shown that, among
alternative ways to do so, modelling vertical relationships among ￿rms located in diﬀerent
markets is a promising strategy, as it brings models more closely into line with the reality of
large discrepancies in cross-border prices.
In our model, due to the presence of downstream retailers, upstream ￿rms with monopoly
power may face diﬀerent demand elasticities in national markets even under symmetric, con-
stant elasticity preferences across countries. Thus, these ￿rms will optimally charge diﬀerent
prices to domestic and foreign dealers ￿ within the limits dictated by the possibility of in-
ternational arbitrage between wholesale and retail markets. As a consequence, the law of one
price fails to hold at both producer and consumer levels, independently of nominal rigidities.
Secondly, as ￿rms optimally adjust markups in the face of demand ￿uctuations, the response
of prices to exchange rate movements is muted at both producer and consumer levels. In
general equilibrium, real and monetary shocks will each have a diﬀerent impact on exchange
rate pass-through. Hence, structural interpretations of estimated elasticities call for identifying
the sources of exchange-rate and price variability. Third, our model yields the result that a
currency depreciation generally worsens the terms of trade. Thus, despite low pass-through
the international transmission of monetary shocks can have expenditure-switching eﬀects. Our
speci￿cation also implies high exchange-rate volatility relative to fundamentals, whereas large
changes in the nominal and real exchange rate are associated with small changes in the real
allocation and the consumer price level.
Key to our approach is that distributive trade requires local inputs and thus there are
vertical interactions among ￿rms across national boundaries. It is worth stressing that vertical
interactions are not exclusively due to distributive trade. Realistically, local inputs can be
employed in some ￿nal stage of manufacturing of the ￿nal product at local level, combined
with traded intermediate goods. Encompassing both distributive trade and manufacturing at
local level, the share of the consumer prices that can be attributed to local costs may actually
become quite high, potentially reinforcing many of the novel results of our analysis.
31The model in this paper has been purposely kept simple by means of convenient assump-
tions. For instance, the elasticity of substitution among individual goods (brands) is the same
in all sectors, the elasticity of substitution among types of good is set equal to one, and there is
no diﬀerence between nontraded goods and distribution services. Relaxing these assumptions
is a key step to confront the model more directly with the data.
Most crucially, we have assumed the most basic vertical structure: an upstream monopolist
sells its product to a perfectly competitive downstream ￿rm (the retailer). In this case, without
distortionary taxation at national level, vertical integration would be completely neutral as
regards the equilibrium allocation. An important task for future research is to generalize our
setup to richer strategic interactions between upstream and downstream ￿rms (e.g., allowing
for non-linear pricing, or nominal rigidities in the goods market), thus bringing more insights
from trade and industrial organization theory into the construction of open macro models.
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36A.1 Firms￿ pricing and the no-arbitrage conditions
This section of the Appendix studies the representative ￿rm￿s problem under the constraint
that prices should not provide opportunities for arbitrage. The (arbitrage-constrained) optimal
































The relevant FOC￿s for ()a n d∗() (including the complementary slackness conditions
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The optimal prices discussed in the main text are derived for the case in which )1 = )2 =0 .A n
important implication of these prices is that, if the Home monopolist can freely discriminate
across national markets, the same is true of the Foreign one. Before proceeding further, note
that if )1 0 and )2 0 then it must be that 
(N + ∗
N)=0  which can be true only for

 = 0. Obviously, as long as distribution costs are strictly positive, the two constraints cannot
be binding at the same time.
37Thus, we can characterize optimal price-setting when either condition is binding. Without
loss of generality set )1 0a n d)2 =0  i.e., ()+
N = ∗() The relevant FOC￿s for ()
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The optimality condition for 
∗
F mirrors the above expression.
A.2 Steady state characterization and multiplicity
In this section of the appendix, we show that our economy can have either a unique or three
steady states, depending on whether the exchange rate elasticity of Home export expenditure is
larger or smaller than the exchange rate elasticity of Home import expenditure, both evaluated
at the symmetric equilibrium with = 1 ￿ a condition reminiscent of the Marshall-Lerner
condition.
Consider a deterministic steady state in which external wealth is zero, i.e.,  H =  F =0 ,
so that the trade balance is zero, and all exogenous variables are set equal to constant values,



























∗$∗ =1 , the nominal exchange rate is equal to 1, and the consumption and
38labor allocation as determined by equations (33) and (35) are equal across countries. More-
over, when the exchange-rate elasticity of import expenditure is larger than the exchange-rate
elasticity of export expenditure in Home currency, both evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium
with =1
* ﬂ FF








there will be two more steady-state equilibria in which
!
!∗ =1 , but the nominal exchange rate
is equal to 	 and  respectively, where 	  1 and 0    1. The consumption and labor
allocations, as determined by equations (33) and (35), will diﬀer across countries.
As the proof of this proposition is the same as the proof of multiple temporary equilibria in
a version of our economy with balanced trade and ￿exible wages, in what follows we write vari-
ables with time subscripts. Since the trade balance is identically equal to zero in equilibrium,
the value of Home exports is equal to the value of Home imports:
 ﬂ ∗
H∗












or, using the expressions for F ﬂ F ∗







































































 the equality above is
always satis￿ed for  = 1. This establishes the ￿rst part of the proposition.
In order to prove the second part, note that both the left-hand side and the right-hand
side of the above expression are nonlinear functions of .F o r  =0  the left-hand side term












 0 (i.e., the value of the Home country imports is above the value of its
39exports). Second, for   the left-hand side diverges, while the right hand side converges
to $ (i.e., Home country net exports are surely positive). Therefore, if the function of 
de￿ned by the left-hand side expression cuts the function de￿ned by the right-hand side one
at  = 1 from above ￿ i.e., the derivative of the ￿rst function with respect to  is smaller in
absolute value than the derivative of the second function both evaluated at  = 1, then the
equilibrium condition is satis￿ed by two more values of the nominal exchange rate,  and 	,
such that 	  1    0. This proves the second part of our proposition.

































































































































































































40By way of example, consider the case in which  = 10 and the productivity level is identical in




A.3 Solving the model
The problem of the Home representative consumer The Home agent  chooses a
consumption plan, a portfolio plan and a wage rate, such as to maximize utility (3) subject to
the budget constraint (7) and total labor demand (68).
The ￿rst order conditions of the Home consumer￿s problem with respect to H(), F()
N()  H+1(),  F+1 and () are, respectively:

H ()
=2 / ()H (48)

F ()
=2 / ()F (49)
1 
N ()
= / ()N (50)
/ ()=/+1 ()(1+#+1) (51)







From these conditions, it is easy to see that, at the optimum, the individual demand for












Using these expressions, it is easy to verify that
()=HH()+FF()+NN() (55)
41The intertemporal allocation of consumption is determined according to the Euler equation:
1
()












































Note that, in the absence of uncertainty the previous condition collapses to the familiar ex-
pression 1 + #+1 = 1+#∗
+1 +1 .




+  0+1()[()+( 1+#+1) H+1()]
(61)
and:
 F+1()= 0+1()(1 + #∗
+1) +1 F+1() (62)
It follows that the ￿ow budget constraint (7) is:
#+1()
1+#+1
+  0+1()-+1() -()+1() "() () (63)
where -+1 is wealth (net assets) at the beginning of period  +1 ,d e ￿ned as:
-+1() ()+( 1+#+1) H+1()+( 1+#∗
+1) +1 F+1() (64)
42Optimization implies that households exhaust their intertemporal budget constraint: the
￿ow budget constraint hold as equality and the transversality condition below is satis￿ed:
lim
→∞
 [0()-()] = 0 (65)
where 0

=+1 0−1. If an interior solution exists (as is the case given our parame-
terization), the resource constraint holds as equality as well. Similar results characterize the
optimization problem of Foreign agent ∗.
Wage setting Consider now the problem of choosing an optimal nominal wage rate one
period in advance. Let !() denote the nominal wage of worker , and de￿ne the Home
















Using the fact that  is the same across sectors, the total demand for the labor input supplied
















Workers are assumed to be monopolistic suppliers of a particular type of labor; thus, they take
into account the above demand schedule when ￿xing the nominal wage rate. We posit that the
number of workers is large enough so that they ignore the impact of their own pricing decision
on the aggregate wage index. As in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [2000a], the ￿rst order condition for









With a competitive labor market, the nominal wage rate equates the disutility of labor to the
marginal utility of consumption of an additional unit of nominal revenue. Because of workers￿
43monopoly power, the wage rate is set with a markup ( 1) over the expected utility cost
of labor eﬀort, expressed in units of domestic currency. Having set the wage rate optimally,
workers stand ready to provide any amount of labor to ￿rms at the going rate, as long as the
real wage is above the marginal disutility of labor. We restrict the size of shocks in such a way
that this will always be the case.
The current account We focus on an equilibrium in which domestic agents are symmetric
within a country (although there could be asymmetries across countries). Aggregating the indi-
vidual budget constraints and using the government budget constraint we obtain an expression
for the Home current account:
 0+1-+1 = - + 1  (70)
where - is de￿ned as wealth net of money balances, or
-+1 -+1 . (71)
Now, 1 is de￿ned as:
1 ﬂ H + 

































































Thus the Home current account becomes

















Clearly, in equilibrium - = -
∗
,f o ra l l.
44